- South Africa: The apartheid government of South Africa shut down its nuclear weapons program for a couple reasons. Government officials were afraid of a post-apartheid government armed with nuclear weapons and South Africa had no nuclear armed enemies.
- Argentina and Brazil: Basically, both countries realized they did not need strategic weapons and could develop mutual trust through bilateral inspections. They however rejected the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and interference from other countries (i.e. the international community).
- Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan: Basically, these countries realized that they needed to focus on their economies and that having nuclear weapons made them targets in a NATO-Russia war. They signed onto the NPT in exchange for economic concessions from the United States.
- India and Pakistan: Basically, both India and Pakistan flatly rejected international norms and developed nuclear weapons. They however limited their development of nuclear weapons after they proved they could get them to work, enough to deter each other.
- North Korea: North Korea has developed several nuclear weapons while negotiating its own nonproliferation with the international community, its regional neighbors and the United States.
Looking
at these several case studies, it is impossible to conclude that
international norms against proliferation have had a decisive effect
in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It appears that
countries do not suspend nuclear weapons programs because they have
come around to thinking that their program is bad form or
inappropriate.
That
said, international norms have made a contribution in some ways. The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
IAEA inspections provide examples of international cooperation that
other countries can follow from. Although Argentina and Brazil
expressly rejected “international” norms, their decision to set
up bilateral inspections is very reminiscent of IAEA inspections.
Although Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan used the signing of the NPT
as a bargaining chip. This bargaining chip provided a tangible goal
for these countries and demonstrated what nonproliferation could look
like.
All
in all, international norms and the international agreements that
represent them make modest contributions to nuclear nonproliferation.
None of the countries discussed limited their nuclear weapons
programs explicitly because of international norms. However
international norms are generally positive elements even when
countries use them for their own self-interest. Furthermore, it
seems that nonproliferation is usually the result of several factors
and not just one.
As
the world's lone super-power and a leader in the field of
nonproliferation it is the responsibility of the United States to
lead the development of international norms against proliferation.
Unfortunately, the United States has often taken steps that undermine
the development of these international norms. The United States is
currently develop bunker-busting bombs, which some politicians think
should have low-yield nuclear warheads. The United States continues to conduct sub-critical nuclear tests, which is most likely for nuclear weapons research.
The United States has changed its seismic activity data to cover up nuclear tests.
Some American politicians are against more missile reduction
treaties with Russia. Although the United States is quick to tell
other countries to fulfill their international obligations it has no
inherent desire to do the same. The United States has not
internalized norms of nonproliferation. Whether this is hypocritical
or not is not the point. The United States uses international norms
as a tool in negotiations. The United States is self-interested,
just like any other nation, and this should come as no surprise.
However, it is in the US self-interest to follow most international
norms on nonproliferation. The United States reporting its seismic
data truthfully, refraining from certain sub-critical nuclear tests,
and reducing its plethora of nuclear-armed missiles gives it
narrative justification for demanding that other nations do the same,
especially Iran.
The
previous case studies have shown that international norms are
unlikely to be decisive when it comes to nonproliferation. However,
they generally provide positive effects and should therefore be
encouraged by the United States.
*
Admittedly, I based my argument on the evidence I have seen. If
there is evidence that leads to another conclusion, I would very much
like to see that.