tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-13693078650811585352024-03-08T05:12:31.709-08:00Nonproliferation and CRAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00210696694724437649noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1369307865081158535.post-66560046323089083172012-12-11T21:31:00.002-08:002012-12-11T22:06:44.149-08:00Are International Norms Important?I recently completed reading <i>Bridled Ambition: Why Countries
Constrain Their Nuclear Ambitions</i>,
which includes case studies of South Africa, Argentina, Brazil,
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
These case studies help us answer the question, are international
norms important in nuclear nonproliferation? International norms
include not developing weapons, not conducting weapons tests, and
allowing inspections. <b>The answer is that international norms against
nuclear proliferation are never the decisive factor in
nonproliferation and only sometimes important.</b> Let's look at some
cases:<br />
<ul>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
South
Africa: The apartheid government of South Africa shut down its
nuclear weapons program for a couple reasons. Government officials
were afraid of a post-apartheid government armed with nuclear
weapons and South Africa had no nuclear armed enemies.</div>
</li>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Argentina
and Brazil: Basically, both countries realized they did not need
strategic weapons and could develop mutual trust through bilateral
inspections. They however rejected the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty and interference from other countries (i.e. the international
community).</div>
</li>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan: Basically, these countries realized that
they needed to focus on their economies and that having nuclear
weapons made them targets in a NATO-Russia war. They signed onto
the NPT in exchange for economic concessions from the United States.</div>
</li>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
India
and Pakistan: Basically, both India and Pakistan flatly rejected
international norms and developed nuclear weapons. They however
limited their development of nuclear weapons after they proved they
could get them to work, enough to deter each other.</div>
</li>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
North
Korea: North Korea has developed several nuclear weapons while
negotiating its own nonproliferation with the international
community, its regional neighbors and the United States.</div>
</li>
</ul>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Looking
at these several case studies, it is impossible to conclude that
international norms against proliferation have had a decisive effect
in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It appears that
countries do not suspend nuclear weapons programs because they have
come around to thinking that their program is bad form or
inappropriate.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
That
said, international norms have made a contribution in some ways. The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
IAEA inspections provide examples of international cooperation that
other countries can follow from. Although Argentina and Brazil
expressly rejected “international” norms, their decision to set
up bilateral inspections is very reminiscent of IAEA inspections.
Although Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan used the signing of the NPT
as a bargaining chip. This bargaining chip provided a tangible goal
for these countries and demonstrated what nonproliferation could look
like.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
All
in all, international norms and the international agreements that
represent them make modest contributions to nuclear nonproliferation.
None of the countries discussed limited their nuclear weapons
programs explicitly because of international norms. However
international norms are generally positive elements even when
countries use them for their own self-interest. Furthermore, it
seems that nonproliferation is usually the result of several factors
and not just one.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
As
the world's lone super-power and a leader in the field of
nonproliferation it is the responsibility of the United States to
lead the development of international norms against proliferation.
Unfortunately, the United States has often taken steps that undermine
the development of these international norms. The United States is
currently develop bunker-busting bombs, which some politicians think
should have low-yield nuclear warheads. <a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iXCRmYv9fG6kLPnjG8EoEtYV6Q_Q?docId=CNG.3f95c385e754e143d148236996969b92.8b1" target="_blank">The United States continues to conduct sub-critical nuclear tests, which is most likely for nuclear weapons research</a>.
<a href="http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5534/my-own-sleuthing-from-home" target="_blank">The United States has changed its seismic activity data to cover up nuclear tests</a>.
Some American politicians are against more missile reduction
treaties with Russia. Although the United States is quick to tell
other countries to fulfill their international obligations it has no
inherent desire to do the same. The United States has not
internalized norms of nonproliferation. Whether this is hypocritical
or not is not the point. The United States uses international norms
as a tool in negotiations. The United States is self-interested,
just like any other nation, and this should come as no surprise.
However, it is in the US self-interest to follow most international
norms on nonproliferation. The United States reporting its seismic
data truthfully, refraining from certain sub-critical nuclear tests,
and reducing its plethora of nuclear-armed missiles gives it
narrative justification for demanding that other nations do the same,
especially Iran.</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b>The
previous case studies have shown that international norms are
unlikely to be decisive when it comes to nonproliferation. However,
they generally provide positive effects and should therefore be
encouraged by the United States.</b></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
*
Admittedly, I based my argument on the evidence I have seen. If
there is evidence that leads to another conclusion, I would very much
like to see that.</div>
<br />Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00210696694724437649noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1369307865081158535.post-39161035801415901512012-11-23T17:55:00.003-08:002012-11-25T15:32:28.189-08:00Lessons from Ukraine, Belarus and KazakhstanI am currently making my way through Mitchell Reiss fascinating book
<i>Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Contstrain their Nuclear
Capabilities (1995)</i>. In his
book, he describes how various countries decided to give up their
nuclear weapons and shut down their nuclear weapons programs.
Included in this book are the stories of Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. These stories offer several lessons that people should
keep in mind when looking at denuclearization options for other
countries today. Not all of these lessons apply to every situation,
but practitioners should at least determine whether they apply or
not.<br />
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<ol>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b>Keeping Nuclear Weapons is
Expensive. </b>Maintaining
nuclear weapons costs a lot of money and these three countries
realized that they did not have the financial resources to maintain
them if they were to focus on growing their economies.</div>
</li>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b>Removing Nuclear Weapons is
Expensive. </b>Because of
economic considerations these countries wanted to get rid of their
nukes, but also because of economic considerations these countries
slow-walked their removal. To varying degrees, these countries
tried to get economic compensation for the removal of these weapons.</div>
</li>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b>Nuclear
Weapons are Bargaining Chips. </b>Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan all realized the risks of keeping nuclear
weapons in their country. They did not have the financial resources
or the local expertise to maintain them. Ukraine, especially,
realized that having nuclear weapons made them a target in a
Nato-Russia war. All that being said, these countries used nuclear
weapons as a bargaining chip. Both Ukraine and Kazakhstan (Belarus
not as much) bargained with Russia and the United States in order to
get financial assistance and more international recognition.</div>
</li>
<li><div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b>Denuclearization
Takes Time. </b>In
all cases, denuclearization took at least a few years.
Denuclearization included removing tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons by train and also signing onto START and the Nuclear
Nonprolifearation Treaty (NPT). Denuclearization takes times even
if all parties want to see it.</div>
</li>
</ol>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
All in all, a reading of these three cases offers the lesson that
denuclearization is a complex matter with many different
considerations (including economic). Negotiating an agreement with a
country is really just the tip of the iceberg.</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00210696694724437649noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1369307865081158535.post-10958723920576044282012-11-04T19:59:00.001-08:002012-11-04T19:59:16.459-08:00Structural Problems in Biosecurity
<br />
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Biosecurity presents several structural problems to states.</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br />
</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
First,
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) does not guarantee states
will not develop biological weapons. The BWC guarantees that states
<i>say</i>
they will not develop biological weapons. Although the BWC offers
many benefits, such as reinforcing an international norm against
bio-weapons, we should be cautious not to overstate its effect. In
explaining the causes of war, Michael Fearon posited the “commitment
problem,” which basically states that even if states sincerely
promise to follow through on something, they may change their policy
later. The Federation of American Scientists <a href="http://www.fas.org/programs/bio/bwcinterpertation.html" target="_blank">argues</a> that the US has
even re-interpreted its obligations under the BWC and now accepts
development of bio-weapons as long as they are not lethal.
For example, North Korea was a signatory to the Nuclear
Nonpoliferation Treaty (NPT), but then changed course and build some
nuclear weapons. It is always possible other states will do the same
with regards to the BWC.</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br />
</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Second and related to the first,
bio-weapons programs are often very hidden from the public and other
states. Unlike commitments to not move troops near borders,
bio-weapons programs cannot be viewed from satellites and leave a
smaller footprint than troop movements. Bio-weapons programs present
a difficulty similar to nuclear weapons programs however nuclear
weapons programs receive much more attention in the international
arena.</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br />
</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Third, bio-defense requires more
international coordination than other security problems. The
interconnectedness of our modern world means that biological attacks
somewhere in the world could spread across international lines.</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br />
</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
Fourth, biological attacks are very
likely to be asymmetrical and unconventional. A small and weak group
or state can threaten the strongest states with biological attack.</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br />
</div>
<div align="LEFT" style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
These are several problems that
biological weapons present unlike other security threats.
International cooperation is a difficult challenge, but must be
pursued vigorously. Agreements are great, but what they actually
mean in practice is key.</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00210696694724437649noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1369307865081158535.post-44050612768199633962012-10-07T10:22:00.005-07:002012-10-13T13:44:14.319-07:00Notes on "Nuclear Terrorism" by Graham Allison<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">In 2004, the renowned Graham Allison released his book "Nuclear Terrorism." Allison offers a simple thesis: a nuclear attack on America is inevitable unless the US government provides a strong, coordinated, serious, all-out attempt to lock-down vulnerable nuclear material around the world and track down all the lose nukes. Allison rightly brings our attention to an important issue. He is right that we cannot take on this issue sitting down, but there are two areas where we disagree.</span><br />
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">First, the situation is not as grave as he makes it out to be. T</span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">here are two types of nuclear threats. There are dirty bombs where nuclear material (i.e. plutonium, uranium, cesium) is blown up by conventional explosives like TNT, c-4, petn. There are also bombs with a nuclear chain reaction (nuclear bombs) where the nuclear material itself expands at trillions of miles per hour incinerating anything in its path. Dirty bombs are destructive; nuclear bombs are catastrophic and life-obliterating. Dirty bombs don't threaten the continuation of the human race, nuclear bombs do. Fortunately for us, Allison overestimates the ease of setting off a nuclear bomb. Based on my reading of the highly-regarded Richard Muller's "Physics and Technology for Future Presidents," you need a lot of highly enriched uranium or plutonium with highly advanced </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">(nation-state level)</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">explosives. Terrorist need to go through many steps to set off a nuclear weapon in the US or an allied country: getting a large quantity of nuclear material, transporting the nuclear material, getting high level explosives, transporting the high level explosives, assembling the weapon, transporting the weapon, setting off the weapon. It is a long process in which there is much time and opportunity for the good guys to stop them. </span><b style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">All and all, we shouldn't deny the real danger, but we can also sleep at night and live in populated areas.</b></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">Second (mistake), when discussing how to prevent states from proliferating nuclear technology (e.g. Iran, North Korea, and Iraq), Allison takes the simplistic perspective that unfortunately too often predominates the public discourse. Basically, Allison offers a limited method for resolving international conflicts over nuclear programs. He says that the US and other great powers should offer nuclear fuel at below market price to aspiring nuclear powers with the condition that the receivers do not enrich their own uranium. Allison says that states that reject this economic bargain are obviously up to no good and have nefarious intentions. He concludes that these bad actors should be stopped with military force if needed. </span></span><b style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">I'm certainly not arguing that bribes, sanctions and military strikes have no place in the range of nonproliferation methods; I'm arguing that they are </span><span style="font-size: small;">not the only methods</span></b><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">. Peaceful and militarized nuclear programs are extremely expensive. States are often not thinking economically when they develop nuclear programs and therefore a simple economic argument is unlikely to persuade them to stop. </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Allison mentions nothing of national pride, strategic defense, fear of regime, change from the outside or inside, or military-industrial interest groups. Offering security guarantees, starting collaborative science projects, and offering deals that address a state's non-economic interests are all methods that should be included with economic and military methods.</span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Not to be too hard on Allison. His book is required reading for anyone interested in counter-proliferation. His book is very accessible for non-experts and a (yes) "enjoyable" read. It does an excellent job of representing a popular argument. <b> It is a large and important piece in the puzzle of nonproliferation and conflict resolution, but it is just one piece.</b></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Stay safe!</span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="background-color: white;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Post-Note: Obviously, I've necessarily simplified the technology and Allison's book in this blog post. However, I hope I have done so while preserving the key concepts.</span></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00210696694724437649noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1369307865081158535.post-11910350044658306812012-10-07T10:22:00.002-07:002012-10-13T13:56:35.144-07:00To Draw or Not To Draw?<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Over the last few weeks, the most
popular question related to nonproliferation and conflict resolution
has been <b>"Should the United States draw a red line regarding
Iran's nuclear program?"</b> Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister
of Israel, was on Meet the Press requesting that Obama draw a red
line, which is basically asking the President to declare what stage of Iranian nuclear development would trigger a US military attack. President
Obama partially drew a red line when he said that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon; however, he does not want to focus on the red-line issue at this time. </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Mitt Romney has said that he agrees with President Obama that Iran
cannot acquire a weapon. Days later Mitt Romney said that Iran
cannot be allowed to have the capability of having a nuclear weapon.
However, this current discussion misses the fact that drawing a red
line is often not such a simple binary decisions. There are some
important questions to ask and several pros and cons to consider
before making this decision.</span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Questions</span></b></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">How specific should the red line be?
Mitt Romney said that the red line should be drawn at Iran having the
capability of acquiring a nuclear weapon, but he also said later that
he didn't think it was helpful to talk specifically about what
technically qualifies as this red line (i.e. 20% enrichment, number
of centrifuges, or 90% enrichment?).</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Should this red line be communicated
publicly? The more the United States presses a red line in public
then the more humiliating and more difficult it will be for Iran to
back down.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Pros (to drawing the red line)</span></b></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Iran is more likely to take the US seriously if it draws a red line. Human beings have a tendency to
take people more seriously if they say "I swear..." or "I
promise..."</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If complemented with technical
specificity, a red line can focus the negotiation on technical facts.
Any peaceful agreement between Iran and the other nations likely
will have to be very technical.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<b><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Cons (to drawing a red line)</span></b></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Drawing a red line is only effective if
Iran treats this threat credibly.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Drawing a red line is effectively
giving away the US's bottom line and telling Iran it can proceed
up to right before this point.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Drawing a red line should not replace
real negotiation. Drawing a red line is about the positions of the
parties to a conflict and does not even scratch beneath the surface
to address the parties' interests. Interest-based negotiation is
what the book Getting to Yes by Fisher and Ury is all about. Drawing
a red line does not address why Iran is interested in nuclear weapons
to begin with.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It could be difficult to tell if Iran crosses the red line because the red line may lack technical
specificity or the intelligence may be wrong.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Drawing a red line puts the conflict on
a narrative path toward war. In this narrative, peace is as only possible through
the use of force or the threat of force. It puts war at the front of
people's minds and people starting dwelling on the red line and when
to go to war and less on how to solve the problem peacefully. And
it's hard to stop a nation once it's put on the path to war.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br />
</span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Essentially, drawing a red line can be
a good negotiation technique but it is dangerous. <b>President Obama
should only draw this red line if he thinks he can hold back the
engines of war long enough to actually negotiate. If he can't, then
he should hold off on firmly drawing the red line. </b>He can always
use this tactic later because current intelligence estimates as
reported in the news tend to say we still have some time before Iran
could build nuclear weapons.</span></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00210696694724437649noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1369307865081158535.post-79494437981070941502012-10-07T10:21:00.002-07:002012-10-07T10:21:33.966-07:00Introduction to the Blog<span style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">Welcome. You have just entered the dynamic intersection of Nonproliferation & Conflict Resolution. Here, we discuss the most pressing Nonproliferation problems of our day and how to solve them. Nonproliferation (in this blog) refers to the reckless spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Conflict Resolution is an emerging field of study somewhat related to international relations, psychology and business. Models of conflict resolution come in many shapes and sizes, including interest-based negotiations (Fisher and Ury), structural and cultural violence (Galtung), and various psychological theories. This blog is for the the politicians, diplomats, scientists, professors and students. More fundamentally, this blog is not about espousing a certain theoretical mindset but rather about offering the best approach to these problems.</span><br />
<div style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">
<br /></div>
<div style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">
Furthermore, nonproliferation like conflict resolution is often best done collaboratively, so we appreciate any comments, suggestions, questions or counter-points!</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00210696694724437649noreply@blogger.com0